BICS 2004 Tutorial,

Models Consciousness: The World Scene (And the Axiomatic Approach)

Igor Aleksander FREng Imperial College, London Visiting Research Fellow, U. Sussex Machine Consciousness Conferences

2001: Cold Spring Harbour

2003: Symposium at ASSC 7, Memphis

2003: ESF Workshop, Birmingham

2003: NoE 'Exystence' Workshop, Turin

2004: Antwerp Parallel with ASSC8

This conference: Session CNS3 10.00 Tuesday, Debate 11.20 Tuesday Machine Consciousness Funding

2004: EPSRC 500K to Owen Holland (Essex) Investigation of Robot Consciousness

2004: EU Call (FET): Architectures that have 'world- and self- awareness'.

Beware of Words!

... For twenty years I ave mistrusted onsciousness .. It is he name of a nonentity and has no right lace among first rinciples ..."

Villiam James

Does Consciousness exist?' 1904 Consciousness:

Where are the molecules?

Being conscious:

What are the mechanisms?

"... Plato, Descartes and Eccles, make no clear distinction between the terms 'consciousness', 'mind' and 'soul'. But in the modern context these terms have different meanings."

Max Velmans, 'Understanding Consciousness' 2000

What do I mean?

<u>Being conscious</u> means that I am experiencing internally an out-there world, self , past, future, intention and fiction.

<u>My Mind</u> is the sum total of my capacity for having such experiences.

Soul is best left to theologians

WHY MACHINES?

There comes a time when you have to stop talking and MAKE SOMETHING

EVEN IF IT IS A MISTAKE!

The late Tom Kilburn of Manchester University

OBJECTIVES FOR MAKING THINGS

To explore 'what it is to be conscious' with engineering clarity

To achieve behaviours in machinery that, in areas of technological need, approach the competence achieved by living organisms


by virtue of being conscious.

(e.g. an autonomous exploratory robot on Mars)


THERE IS A SPECTRUM OF WAYS IN WHICH PEOPLE APPROACH

BEING CONSCIOUS


IN MACHINES



CONSCIOUS?



CONSCIOUS MACHINES PARADIGM



FUNCTIONAL

MATERIAL



Stan Franklin – University of Memphis The Intelligent Distributed Agent (IDA)

Used to billet US Navy personnel via e-mail


Replaces conscious human billeters

Methodology based on Bernie Baars' Global Workpsace theory.


Franklin, S. & Graesser, A. (1999). A Software Agent Model of Consciousness. *Consciousness and Cognition* 8, 285–301.

Baars, B.J. (1997). *In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind*. Oxford University Press.

he IDA System







FUNCTIONAL

MATERIAL



Murray Shanahan – Imperial College, London The 'Logic process' of consciousness

- 1. The frame problem: Uses Baars' global workspace to constrain computation to only that which is relevant
- Shanahan, M. & Baars, B. (2004). Applying Global Workspace Theory to the Frame Problem *to be published 2004*.
 - 2. Rehearsals in internal computational models of sensorimotor space
- Shanahan, M. The Imaginative Mind: Rehearsing Trajectories Through an Abstraction of Sensorimotor Space *to be published 2004*

m.shanahan@imperial.ac.uk



Clarifying consciousness and computational models of emotions


Sloman, A and Chrisley, R: Virtual machines and consciousness. Jour Conc St, vol 10, no 4-5, 2003 pp133-72

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/



Using control systems theory for large system to model consciousness and to use consciousness for the control of complex plant.

Systems and Consciousness (ASSC7) Ricardo Sanz, Juan Escasany and Ignacio L´opez Universidad Polit´ecnica de Madrid, ricardo.sanz@etsii.upm.es



Cyberchild: An accurate biochemical model of a young baby. Consciousness to do with physico/chemical states

Cotterill, R.M.J. (2003). CyberChild: a simulation test-bed for consciousness studies. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 10(4-5), 31-45







Phenomenology?

In retrospect ... (where I come from...)

11 years of agonising about the possibility of MC: From an automata theory/material point of view

1992: The Colin Cherry Memorial lecture ICANN 92

1996: 'Impossible Minds': 1 postulate 11 corollaries

2000: Depictive theory published

2001: Axioms introduced at Skovde

2003: Axiomatic/Depictive theory published in JCS

Key design principle:


Introspection, shunned by psychologists

OK for developing designs.


Written as axioms: i.e. features resulting from introspection. What could be special about mechanisms that can produce for them what for *me* feels that I am conscious ?

"an inner sensation of world, self, past, future, intention and fiction"

WHAT USE ARE INTROSPECTIVE AXIOMS?




What set of mechanisms could support the inner sensations described by the set of axioms?



Interlocking Mechanisms

THE AXIOMS

Ieksander & Dunmall: Axioms and Tests for the Presence of Minimal Consciousness in Agents, Journal of Consciousness Studies June, 2003)






First Person Phenomenon:

I feel as if *I* am in the middle of an "out there" world.

Material Implications of Axiom 1




Material Implications of Axiom 1

Unique minimal world events have a unique coding (easy with a cellular structure)

Minimal events compose complex events both in the world and the mechanism

OUT THERE ??



LOCKING

Evidence:

Galletti and Battaglini, J Neurosci, 9, 1112-1125, **1989** > V3 (Gaze-locked) Galletti et al, *Europ J Neursci*,9(2),410-413, **1997** > Arm movment in vis sys V6A. Galletti et al, *Exp. Brain Res.* 96 (2): 221-229, **1993** > **Head-indexed in parietal.** Bender & Youakim, *J Neurophys*, 85(1), 219-234, 2001> Att. Lock V2,V4, 7a. Boussaoud et al, *Exp Brain Res*, 128 (1-2): 170-180, **1999**> All visuomotor paths. Trotter & Celebrini, *Nature*, 15(5): 398(6724): 239-242, **1999**> **Prestriate V1** Trotter et. Al, *J Neurophys*, 76(5), 2872-2885, **1996** > View dist. Coded in V1 Bremmer et al., *Europ J Neursci*, 10(1), 153-160, **1998** > V3A, 7a, V6 Post. Pariet Duhamel et.al., *Nature*, 389 (6653): 845-848, **1997** > Ventral IntraParietal Guo & Li, *Neuroreport*, 8 (6): 1405-1409,**1997** > All over striate cortex Siegel, Jour of Comp Neursci, 5(4), 365-381, **1998**> Gaze locking in parietal 7a Gdowski et.al., *Exp. Brain Res.* 135 (4): 511-526, **2000** > Neck/gaze coding. Desimone, *Proc Nat Acad Sci. USA* (93): 13 494-9, **1996**> Attention in extrastriate

Aleksander & Dunmall Proc R. Soc. London B, Jan 22, 2000

Material Implications of Axiom 1

The design that captures

- Composition from minimal events
- Out-thereness

We shall call

DEPICTIVE

(Alva Noe: enacted/sensorimotor)




First Person Phenomenon:

*can recall 'out there'*worlds and imagine worlds*have never experienced.*

Material Implications of Axiom 2

Depictive neural firing is sustained due to cells forming closed loops or layers 're-entering': (Major link with complexity phenomena)

Communicating neurons: memory and imagination







First Person Phenomenon:

I am conscious of only that to which I attend.

Material Implications of Axiom 3

External Attention:

Is driven by localization signals for important events in the 'out-there' world and continuity.

Material Implications of Axiom 3

Internal Attention:

Is driven by the use of internally driven motor locking signals (inverse to reconstruction)

Or

Informational continuity



First Person Phenomenon:

I imagine future events in the world and determine my actions to get what

Material Implications of Axiom 4

Depictive states have a chaining property shaped by learning and recalled in imagination. Re - entry is again responsible for this



First Person Phenomenon:

My emotions affect and are affected by my decisions.

Material Implications of Axiom 5


Structures continually (and innately?) evaluate perceptual and imagined future events in preparation for action .


Emotions have a global effect on depictive structures A vital corollary resulting from the Axioms



The Emergence of *SELF*

Combinations of sensory, imaginational attentional and affective depictions lead to descriptions starting with the word *I*









NEURAL REPRESENTATION MODELLER

(A 'meccano' for modelling brain regions - designed by Barry Dunmall)




	Some past work from a MC standpoint
1998:	Imagining Colour & Shape (Ax 1,2)
1999:	Saccadic Face Perception and Recognition (Ax 1,2,3)
2000:	Theory of depiction (Ax 1,2)
2001:	Planning and Stacking Action (Ax 1,2,3,4)
2002:	Mobile Robot (Ax 1,2,3,4)
2003:	Visual Deficits in Parkinson's disease (Ax 1,2,3)





The first three axioms at work in a Virtual Machine

The architecture is heavily influenced by how the brain is structured



Depictive attack on natural language (Rao, Lineker)

Depictive models of emotions (Lahnstein, Dunmall)

What next?

Depictive plan selection (Rabinder Lee – Oct 03)

What does this tell us?

That we have a long way to go! BUT



What does this tell us?

Axiomatic theory,

(Note echoes of Chalmers' structural coherence).

Suggests what is needed for an object to be conscious (i.e. design principles of structure that can cohere with sensation).



What does this tell us?

The five axioms seems a *necessary* set...

... a *sufficient* set may be very large and investigator dependent!

"What is it like to be a bat?"

Thomas Nagel Philo Rev 1974 While agreeing that this first person question cannot be answered.....

... A related question *can* be answered....

"What must the bat's brain do so that the bat can know what it's like to be a bat?"

Contact

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Look out for

The World in My Mind, My Mind in the World: *Key Mechanisms for Consciousness in Humans, Animals and Machines*